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Abstract
I study a continuous time principal-agent model in which an unknown parameter and
the agent’s hidden effort affect the distribution of observable outcomes. The principal
and the agent learn about the parameter by observing past outcomes. The agent’s current
effort has an implicit long-term effect through the belief dynamics and a deviation in effort
creates a persistent disparity between the principal’s and the agent’s beliefs. This disparity
affects the rate of learning as well as how the two evaluate the expected distribution of
future outcomes which in turn affects their evaluation of future payoffs. Placing minimal
restrictions on how effort and the parameter interact, I derive necessary and sufficient
conditions for incentive compatible contracts. In addition to the agent’s promised utility,
the covariance between the on-path posterior beliefs and the agent’s total payoff serves as
a second state variable capturing the marginal long-run effects of effort.
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mum principle.
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1 Introduction
A key component in every moral hazard problem is the production function - the mapping
from the agent’s hidden effort to a distribution of observable outcomes. The principal, unable
to monitor effort, provides incentives by tying the agent’s payoff to the observed outcome.1
Thus, the structure of incentives depends on the structure of the production function. While
the assumption of complete information about the production function is standard, in reality,
outcomes may also depend on variables that are unobservable. For example, the school per-
formance of a student depends not only on the amount of effort the student’s teacher exerts
but also on unobservable variables such as the student’s ability. Hence, a principal designing
incentive schemes for the teacher has to take into account the uncertainty about the student’s
ability.
When the agency problem is repeated multiple times, the principal and the agent learn
about the unobserved variables by using past outcomes to update their beliefs. The posterior
beliefs in turn affect the expected distribution of current and future outcomes. In this dynamic
setting with learning, the hidden effort assumption plays a new role: the principal’s posterior
beliefs are based on a conjecture of the agent’s strategy and the agent can manipulate the
principal’s beliefs by deviating away from the conjecture. Such deviations create a persistent
gap between the principal’s and the agent’s posteriors. Furthermore, a deviation can create a
disparity in the rate of learning between the agent and the principal.2 Whether or not such a
deviation is beneficial to the agent depends on the structure of the production function as well
as the provision of dynamic incentives.
In this paper, I study a principal-agent contracting problem in which the distribution of
outcomes depends on the agent’s effort and an unknown parameter. In particular, I study
a continuous time finite horizon problem where outcome is described by a Brownian motion
with a drift. The drift plays the role of a production function and is controlled by the agent’s
effort and a fully persistent parameter. The principal, the residual claimant of the produced
outcome, offers and commits to a history-dependent contract in order to provide incentives to
the agent. The continuous time model allows for a tractable expression of the learning dynamics
and simplifies the complexity of the problem through powerful optimization techniques such as
1I use feminine pronouns to refer to the principal and masculine ones to refer to the agent.
2Think of the distribution of outcomes for each effort level as an experiment. Suppose experiments become more
informative as effort increases. Then an agent who deviates upwards from the principal’s conjecture knows the
quality of the experiment has improved. The agent will therefore update the posterior more aggressively than
the principal.
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the stochastic maximum principle (Bismut 1973, 1977; Zhou 1996).
I consider general production functions with minimal restrictions on how effort interacts
with the parameter. The generality is helpful to understand how different assumptions on the
production function, such as the complementarity between effort and the parameter, affect
the learning process and the contracting problem. I provide general necessary and sufficient
conditions for the agent’s problem and show that incentives are based on two state variables:
the agent’s promised (continuation) utility and the covariance between the agent’s payoffs and
posterior beliefs. Under mild conditions on the production function, I also show that the agent
is exposed to more risk under incomplete information than under complete information for some
parameter value.
Since Abreu et al. (1986, 1990) and Spear and Srivastrava (1987), the use of the agent’s
promised utility as a state variable is well understood. More recently, in a continuous time
setting with complete information about the production function, Sannikov (2008) shows that
the promised utility alone is both necessary and sufficient for a recursive formulation of incentive
compatible contracts. The principal provides incentives by controlling the sensitivity of the
agent’s promised utility to the random fluctuations in the observed outcome, thereby exposing
the agent to some degree of risk. The optimal degree of risk exposure trades off the agent’s
marginal disutility of effort with the marginal productivity at each instant of time.
However, when there is incomplete information about the production function, a charac-
terization of incentive compatible contracts may require additional state variables. The key
issue that arises under incomplete information is that hidden action begets hidden information:
the agent’s belief dynamics depend on past effort choices that are unobserved by the principal.
Thus, the agent’s posterior beliefs become part of the agent’s private information. I show that
a second state variable, the discounted covariance between on-path beliefs and total payoffs, is
necessary to account for the agent’s private information.
The agent’s private information affects payoffs through a single channel; future payoffs
depend on the expected distribution of future outcomes which in turn depends on posterior
beliefs. Thus, the second state variable must capture the interplay between the persistent
effect of effort on beliefs and future incentives (the sensitivity of the agent’s utility to outcome
fluctuations). Under complete information, beliefs are degenerate and there is no persistent
effect of effort. Similarly, if the agent is given constant utility, then there is no benefit to
having private information about the parameter. In both cases, the covariance is a constant
zero process and becomes a redundant state variable.
Another interpretation of the covariance state variable is possible by casting the contracting
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problem as a dynamic mechanism design problem. The agent’s beliefs serve as “types” that
are correlated over time. The principal designs a mechanism that affects the agent’s payoff
based on the history of “type reports”. Misreporting today would require the agent to keep
misreporting in the future in a manner that is consistent with how types evolve over time.
Following the dynamic mechanism design approach of Pavan et al. (2014), the covariance state
variable can be interpreted as the dynamic virtual surplus that accounts for the marginal effect
of the agent’s current type report on his payoffs as well as on his future reports.
The papers closest to this one are Prat and Jovanovic (2014), Demarzo and Sannikov
(2016), and He et al. (2017), who characterize the optimal dynamic contract under incomplete
information. The first paper considers the case in which the parameter is fully persistent and
the latter two consider a parameter that evolves stochastically over time. However, in all three
papers, effort and the parameter enter the production function additively, and as such, their
conditions for incentive compatibility are a special case of the conditions presented in this
paper. More importantly, an additively separable production function is not just a simplifying
assumption; it implies the agent’s current effort always has a persistent negative effect on his
future payoffs that creates an incentive to shirk.3. This paper provides tractable conditions
for incentive compatibility even when effort and the parameter interact more intricately, for
example, when the production function is multiplicative as in the experimentation literature
(Bolton and Harris, 1999).
This paper is also related to Sannikov (2014) who considers an agency problem where effort
has explicit long-term consequences. An increase in the agent’s current effort not only improves
the current outcome but also raises the likelihood of good outcomes in the future. Thus, the
agent’s current effort always has a persistent positive effect on his future payoffs that lowers the
incentives to shirk. In this paper, the agent’s current effort has long-term effects only implicitly
through learning. In Section 1.1.3, I use a simple two-period, two-outcome model to show that
learning models exclude the case of unambiguously positive persistent effects.
My methodology borrows from Williams (2011, 2015) who is the first to apply the stochastic
maximum principle to agency problems. Williams (2011) studies an agent who reports income
or taste shocks to a principal in order to smooth his consumption. Williams (2015) characterizes
the optimal contract in an agency model that has complete information about the production
function but allows for hidden savings by the agent. The main difference to my paper is that any
deviation by the agent (misreporting shocks or saving more than conjectured) has no impact
on the production function. In contrast, the persistent effects of effort on beliefs, and thereby
3See Section 1.1.3.
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the production function, is the crucial component of private information in my paper.
More broadly, this paper is related to the literature on dynamic long-term contracting in
agency models that feature: complete information and lump sum payments (Holmstrom and
Milgrom, 1987; Schattler and Sung, 1993; Sung, 1995; Cvitanic´ et al., 2009), explicit long
term-effects of effort (Jarque, 2010; Hopenhayn and Jarque, 2010), funding experimentation
(Bergemann and Hege, 1998, 2005; Horner and Samuelson, 2013; Kwon, 2017), and incomplete
information with dogmatic beliefs (Adrian and Westerfield, 2009).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: I first highlight how the interactions between
effort and beliefs creates persistent effects through a simple two-period, two-outcome model in
Section 1.1. In Section 2, I present the main continuous time model. I derive the necessary and
sufficient conditions for incentive compatible contracts in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. All
proofs are in the Appendix.
1.1 Two-Period Setting
Prior to the continuous time model, it is instructive to first explore two-period, two-outcome
models. I consider three different principal-agent models: a standard moral hazard problem, a
moral hazard problem with explicit long-run consequences, and a moral hazard problem with
incomplete information. In all three models, the agent (he) chooses an action at ∈ [0, 1] , A
for each period t = 1, 2. Given a wage W ∈ R and an action choice a ∈ A, the agent’s payoff
is given by
u(W )− c(a),
where u′(·), c′(·) > 0 and u′′(·) < 0, c′′(·) ≥ 0. Future payoffs are discounted at rate δ ∈ (0, 1).
The principal (she) cannot monitor the agent’s action and only observes if the outcome in
each period, yt, is a success, S, or a failure, F . The principal-agent relationship begins with
the principal offering a contract and committing to it. A contract, {ar, w}, is a pair of action
recommendations for each period,
ar1 ∈ A, and ar2 : {F, S} → A,
along with a pair of wage payments
w1 : {F, S} → R, and w2 : {F, S}2 → R.
A contract {ar, w} is incentive compatible if the agent is willing to follow the action recommen-
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dations. The following three models differ in how the agent’s actions affect the distribution of
observable outcomes.
1.1.1 Standard Moral Hazard Problem
Consider first a standard moral hazard model: in each period, yt = S with probability f(at) ∈
[0, 1] with f ′(·) > 0 so that a higher action leads to a more favorable distribution of outcomes.
The distribution of outcomes in each period is independent of the action choices made in prior
periods.
Fix a contract {ar, w}. If the contract is incentive compatible, then given any first period
outcome y1, the recommendation in the second period a
r
2(y1) must be a solution to
max
a2∈A
f(a2)
[
u
(
w2(y1, S)
)− u(w2(y1, F ))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
,ζ2(y1)
−c(a2). (1)
We can interpret ζ2(y1) as the bonus the agent gets for a successful outcome in period 2
conditional on already having produced y1 in period 1. Similarly, the recommendation in the
first period ar1 must be a solution to
max
a1∈A
f(a1)
[
u
(
w1(S)
)
+ δV2(S)− u
(
w1(F )
)− δV2(F )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
,ζ1
−c(a1), (2)
where
V2(y1) = f
(
ar2(y1)
)
ζ2(y1) + u
(
w2(y1, F )
)− c(ar2(y1))
is the agent’s continuation value (also referred to as promised utility) given outcome y1. We can
interpret ζ1 as the agent’s bonus for a successful outcome in period 1. The tuple {ζ1, ζ2(S), ζ2(F )}
only depend on the wages and recommendations specified in the contract and are therefore un-
der the principal’s control.
If the recommended actions are in the interior of A, we can use the first order necessary
conditions from (1) and (2) to derive the following expressions:
1. ζ2(y1) =
c′
(
ar2(y1)
)
f ′
(
ar2(y1)
) , ∀y1 ∈ {F, S} and
2. ζ1 =
c′(ar1)
f ′(ar1)
.
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In each period, the bonus captures the trade-offs between the current marginal cost and the
current marginal productivity of the recommended action. Past actions or outcomes have no
direct effect.
In a continuous time setting, Sannikov (2008) shows that the principal can incentivize the
agent to choose the desired action by controlling the sensitivity of his promised utility to the
performance measure, i.e., the change in output. Furthermore, the sensitivity of the promised
utility is simply the ratio of marginal cost to marginal productivity at the desired action level.
Hence, the agent’s per period bonus for successful outcomes in the two-period model is analogous
to the promised utility sensitivity in a continuous time model.
1.1.2 Moral Hazard Problem with Long-run Consequences
A more general model of moral hazard accommodates for past actions and outcomes to have
a persistent effect on the distribution of future outcomes. For example, a boxer who exerts
himself early in a match improves his chances of winning the first few rounds but may not be
as powerful in the latter rounds. In contrast, a student who studies hard early in the quarter
not only improves his chances for passing the midterm but also the final exam.
Consider an alteration to the previous model such that in the second period, the outcome
is y2 = S with probability g(a2|a1, y1) ∈ [0, 1]. Assume that g is differentiable in both a1 and
a2, and that ga2(·|a1, y1) > 0 for all histories {a1, y1}.4 Nothing changes in the first period.
Fix a contract {ar, w}. Given any first period action choice a1 and outcome y1, let a∗2(a1, y1)
be the action that maximizes the agent’s period 2 payoff, i.e., a∗2(a1, y1) solves
max
a2∈A
g(a2|a1, y1)
[
u
(
w2(y1, S)
)− u(w2(y1, F ))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
,η2(y1)
−c(a2)
From the perspective of period 2, nothing fundamental has changed between the standard
model in Section 1.1.1 and the current one. As before, η2(·) is the agent’s bonus for a successful
outcome in period 2. The principal chooses the bonus via the wages she offers while the agent
affects the distribution of second period outcomes through his action choice. Let
V2(a1, y1) = g
(
a∗2(a1, y1)|a1, y1
)
η2(y1) + u
(
w2(y1, F )
)− c(a∗2(a1, y1))
4For some subset X ⊆ Rn and some differentiable function G : X → R, I write Gxi(x) for ∂G(x)/∂xi when
n > 1 and G′(x) when n = 1.
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be the agent’s continuation value for any arbitrary history {a1, y1}. In period 1, the agent solves
max
a1∈A
f(a1)
[
u
(
w1(S)
)
+ δV2(a1, S)− u
(
w1(F )
)− δV2(a1, F )]+ δV2(a1, F )− c(a1). (3)
The contract {ar, w} is incentive compatible if ar1 solves (3) and ar2(y1) = a∗2(ar1, y1) for all y1.
Notice the differences between (2) and (3): in the latter, the agent’s first period action
directly enters the continuation values because it has a persistent effect on the distribution of
future outcomes. Hence, the agent’s bonus in the first period endogenously depends on his
first period action (unlike ζ1 that is exogenously determined via the wages in the contract).
Consequently, the principal in this altered setting can only control the on-path bonus, given by
η1 = u
(
w1(S)
)
+ δV2(a
r
1, S)− u
(
w1(F )
)− δV2(ar1, F ).
If the agent deviates to an action a1 6= ar1, he would face a different bonus.
If the recommended actions are in the interior of A, we can again use the necessary first
order conditions to derive the following expressions for the bonuses:
1. η2(y1) =
c′
(
ar2(y1)
)
ga2
(
ar2(y1)|ar1,y1
) , ∀y1 ∈ {F, S}, and
2. η1 =
c′(ar1)
f ′(ar1)
− δ
f ′(ar1)
{
f(ar1)ga1
(
ar2(S)|ar1, S
)
η2(S) + (1− f(ar1))ga1
(
ar2(F )|ar1, F
)
η2(F )
}
,
Similar to the first model, the agent’s bonus in each period captures the trade-offs between
the marginal cost of effort and the marginal productivity of effort. However, the first period
bonus, η1, is also inter-temporally linked to future bonuses due to the persistence of the first
period action on future outcomes.
After a first period outcome y1, the agent exerts effort in the second period only if the
principal offers him a strictly positive bonus, i.e., η2(y1) > 0. If ga1 < 0 (as in the example of
the boxer), the agent faces a negative persistent effect; by exerting effort in the first period,
the agent is less likely to earn a bonus in period 2. Hence, the principal must offer a more
high-powered incentive scheme in the first period to compensate the agent for the additional
trade-off he faces. In other words, the principal front loads incentives. On the other hand, if
ga1 > 0 (as in the example of the student), exerting effort in period 1 leads to higher chances of
earning a bonus in both periods. Since, the bonus in period 2 amplifies the agent’s incentives
to work in period 1, the principal back loads incentives.
The term in curly braces above captures the marginal persistent effect that a deviation from
the recommended period 1 action has on the agent’s continuation value. When the first period
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action has no direct effect on the distribution of future outcomes, i.e., ga1 = 0, we recover the
expressions for ζ1. However, if ga1 ≤ 0 (ga1 ≥ 0), then a principal who wishes to implement
a recommended action ar1 must offer a higher (lower) bonus in the current model than in the
standard model of Section 1.1.1, i.e., η1 ≥ ζ1 (η1 ≤ ζ1).
A similar conclusion is reached by Sannikov (2014) in a continuous time setting that is
analogous to the current two period model with
f(a1) = a1,
g(a2|a1, y1) = (1− β)a2 + βa1,∀y1 ∈ {F, S}
where β ∈ (0, 1/2). As the first period action has a positive persistent effect on the distribution
of future outcomes ( ga1 > 0), incentives are back loaded: the sensitivity of the promised
utility starts off lower than the ratio of marginal cost to marginal productivity of effort and is
subsequently adjusted upwards as time progresses.
1.1.3 Moral Hazard Problem with Incomplete Information
Consider a second variant to the standard model: in each period t = 1, 2, yt = S with probability
h(θ, at) ∈ [0, 1], where θ ∈ {θL, θH} is an unobserved parameter. Assume that ha(θ, ·) > 0 for
all θ. The principal and the agent have a common prior Pr(θ = θH) = p1 ∈ (0, 1). Given a
history {a1, y1}, the agent updates his belief in period 2 to p2(a1, y1) using Bayes rule.5 It is
easy to check that
∂p2(a1, S)
∂a
≥ 0⇔ ha(θH , a1)
ha(θL, a1)
≥ h(θH , a1)
h(θL, a1)
, (4)
and
∂p2(a1, F )
∂a
≥ 0⇔ 1− h(θH , a1)
1− h(θL, a1) ≥
ha(θH , a1)
ha(θL, a1)
. (5)
This third model is a special case of the second one in which past actions affect the expected
distribution of future outcomes via the beliefs the agent holds. In particular, we can embed
this model into the second one by setting
f(a1) = p1h(θH , a1) + (1− p1)h(θL, a1)
5If the parameter θ is observable, or if there is no learning, then the third model is equivalent to the first one.
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and
g(a2|a1, y1) = p2(a1, y1)h(θH , a2) +
(
1− p2(a1, y1)
)
h(θL, a2).
The type of persistent effect that arises from exerting effort in period 1 is tied to how beliefs
evolve which in turn depends on the interaction between the parameter and actions. Given any
history {a1, y1},
ga1(a2|a1, y1) =
∂p2(a1, y1)
∂a
(
h(θH , a2)− h(θL, a2)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,∆h(a2)
,
and we can express the marginal effect of increasing the first period action a1 by
−c′(a1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal cost
+ η1f
′(a1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal instantaneous benefit
from increased productivity
+ (6)
f(a1) η2(S)∆h
(
a∗2(a1, S)
)∂p2(a1, S)
∂a︸ ︷︷ ︸
persistent effect conditional on y1=S
+ (1− f(a1)) η2(F )∆h
(
a∗2(a1, F )
)∂p2(a1, F )
∂a︸ ︷︷ ︸
persistent effect conditional on y1=F
.
Unlike the model in Section 1.1.2, actions in this model cannot have an unambiguous
positive persistent effect: If ga1 > 0, then ∂p2(·, y1)/∂a and ∆h(a2) must have the same sign
for all a2 and y1. However, using (4) and (5),
∂p2(·, y1)
∂a
> (<)0,∀y1 =⇒ 1− h(θH , a)
1− h(θL, a) > (<)
h(θH , a)
h(θL, a)
,∀a =⇒ ∆h(a) < (>)0,∀a.
On the other hand, unambiguous negative persistent effects are accommodated by this setting.
Example 1: Let h(θ, a) = 0.5(a+ θ), with 1 > θH > θL > 0.
As ∆h(a) = 0.5(θH − θL) > 0, the sign of ga1 is pinned down by the sign of ∂p2(a1, y1)/∂a.
Using (4), ∂p2(·, S)/∂a < 0 as
1 =
ha(θH , a)
ha(θL, a)
<
h(θH , a)
h(θL, a)
=
θH + a
θL + a
, ∀a =⇒ ga1(a2|·, S) < 0,∀a2.
Similarly, using (5), ∂p2(·, F )/∂a < 0 as
1 =
ha(θH , a)
ha(θL, a)
>
1− h(θH , a)
1− h(θL, a) =
2− (θH + a)
2− (θL + a) , ∀a =⇒ ga1(a2|·, F ) < 0,∀a2.
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Hence, providing the agent with incentives to work in period 2 dampens his period 1 incentives.
The agent’s period 1 bonus is ultimately higher than the simple marginal effort to marginal
productivity ratio he would earn under complete information.
This example is analogous to the continuous time setting of Prat and Jovanovic (2014) who
show that when the agent’s effort and the unobserved state are additively separable, incentives
are front loaded: the sensitivity of the agent’s promised utility is much higher in early periods.
Unfortunately, even when we impose a lot of structure on h(θ, a), it is generally difficult to
conclude the overall effect of a1.
Example 2: Let h(θ, a) = 0.5 + 0.5aθ with 1 > θH > θL > 0.
As ∆h(a) = 0.5a(θH − θL) ≥ 0, the sign of ga1 is pinned down by the sign of ∂p2(a1, y1)/∂a.
Using (4), ∂p2(·, S)/∂a > 0 as
θH
θL
=
ha(θH , a)
ha(θL, a)
>
h(θH , a)
h(θL, a)
=
1 + aθH
1 + aθL
, ∀a =⇒ ga1(a2|·, S) > 0,∀a2 > 0.
Therefore, providing the agent with incentives to work in period 2 after y1 = S also amplifies
his period 1 incentives. In contrast, using (5), ∂p2(·, F )/∂a < 0 as
θH
θL
=
ha(θH , a)
ha(θL, a)
>
1− h(θH , a)
1− h(θL, a) =
1− aθH
1− aθL , ∀a =⇒ ga1(a2|·, F ) < 0,∀a2 > 0.
Therefore, providing the agent with incentives to work in period 2 after y1 = F dampens
his period 1 incentives. Whether exerting effort in period 1 has an overall positive or negative
persistent effect will depend on which of the two opposite effects above is stronger. For example,
if the principal sets η2(F ) = 0, the agent has no incentives to work in the second period after
y1 = F . The only remaining persistent effect from (6) would then be the positive effect after
y1 = S . However, we would have to solve the full contracting problem to reach a conclusive
answer in the two-period, two-outcome model. The next sections provides a general treatment
of incentive compatible dynamic contracts in a continuous time setting where we can say more.
2 Model
A principal wishes to hire an agent over a finite horizon [0, T ]. At each time t, the agent can take
some action at ∈ A , [0, a¯] that is unobserved by the principal. Let a , (at)0≤t≤T represent
an arbitrary action policy. The agent’s actions affect the publicly observable output process
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Y = (Yt)0≤t≤T which evolves according to
dYt = f(θ, at)dt+ σdBt,
where B , (Bt)t≥0 is the standard one-dimensional Brownian motion on a probability space
(Ω,F , P ), σ > 0 is a finite constant, and θ ∈ Θ , {θ0, θ1} is an exogenous and unobservable
parameter. The drift function f : Θ×A→ R captures how actions interact with the parameter
to affect the average flow of output.
(A.1) f : Θ× A→ R is continuously differentiable in a with fa(θ, ·) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ.
Neither the principal nor the agent observe the parameter. At t = 0, they share a common
prior that θ = θ1 with probability p0 ∈ [0, 1]. The agent knows the history of output as well as
the history of his actions. Hence, the agent’s information set at time t is given by the filtration
Fat , σ(Ys, as : 0 ≤ s ≤ t). An admissible action policy for the agent is any policy a such that
at ∈ A is Fat -adapted.
Given an action policy a, the agent updates his belief at time t from p0 to p
a
t which evolves
according to6
dpat =p
a
t (1− pat )
∆f(at)
σ
[
dYt − f¯(pat , at)dt
σ
]
=pat (1− pat )
∆f(at)
σ
dZat . (7)
The function
∆f(a) , f(θ1, a)− f(θ0, a)
captures two pieces of information. First, when ∆f(a) ≥ 0, a large flow of output is evidence
in favor of θ1. Symmetrically, when ∆f(a) ≤ 0, a large flow of output is evidence in favor of
θ0. Second, the larger |∆f(a)| is, the stronger the evidence. Given a posterior belief p ∈ [0, 1]
and action a ∈ A,
f¯(p, a) , pf(θ1, a) + (1− p)f(θ0, a)
represents the expected flow of output. The process Za , (Zat )t≥0 is the standard Brownian
motion under the measure Qa - the probability measure induced by the action policy a. The
6See Lipster and Shiryaev, Chapter 9.
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stochastic process dZat represents the discrepancy at time t between the observed change in
output dYt and the expected change in output f¯(p
a
t , at)dt.
7
The belief process (7) has an intuitive description. For example, assume ∆f(at) > 0 so
that a high output flow is evidence of θ1. Whenever the realized flow of output dYt exceeds the
agent’s expectation f¯(pat , at)dt, he updates his belief upwards. Similarly, when the realized flow
of output falls short of the agent’s expectation, he updates his belief downwards. Moreover,
beliefs are updated significantly when the uncertainty, pat (1− pat ), is high or when the evidence,
|∆f(at)|, is strong.
Since the principal cannot observe the agent’s actions, her information set at time t is given
by the filtration FYt , σ(Ys : 0 ≤ s ≤ t). At t = 0, the principal offers and commits to a
contract. An admissible contract is a tuple 〈ar, c, CT 〉, where (ar, c) , (art , ct)0≤t≤T is a pair
of recommendation and compensation policies such that (art , ct) ∈ A ×R is FYt -adapted, and
CT ∈ R is an FYT -measurable terminal payment. Thus, recommendations and payments at
time t can depend in an arbitrary way on the history of output but they cannot depend on
what the principal does not know such as future realizations of output, the parameter, or the
agent’s past actions.
At time t, the principal updates her belief based on the history of output and action
recommendations from p0 to p
r
t , which evolves according to
dprt = p
r
t (1− prt )
∆f(art )
σ
dZa
r
t ,
where the process Za
r , (Zart )t≥0 is the standard Brownian motion under Qa
r
- the probability
measure induced when the agent follows the recommended policy ar.8 If the agent follows the
recommendations, the agent’s and the principal’s beliefs (and filtrations) also coincide.
For an action-wage pair (a, c) ∈ A × R, the agent’s flow payoff is given by u(a, c) which
he discounts at a constant rate r > 0. Furthermore, given a terminal payment of c ∈ R, his
terminal utility is given by U(c).
(A.2) u : A×R→ R is continuously differentiable in a with ua(·, c) < 0 for all c.
Given an admissible contract 〈ar, c, CT 〉 and action policy a, the agent’s payoff at time t
7In non-linear filtering problems, the process Za is called the innovation process. See Kallianpur et al. (1972).
8dZa
r
t = (dYt − f¯(prt , art )dt)/σ. See proof of Theorem 1 for more details.
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is given by
Vt(a) ,
∫ t
0
e−rsu(as, cs)ds+ Eat
[∫ T
t
e−rsu(as, cs)ds+ e−rTU(CT )
]
,
where Eat is a shorthand for E[·|Fat ]. Specifically, it is the expectation operator with respect to
the measure Qa at time t. I further assume the following integrability conditions hold at each
period t for any admissible contract 〈ar, c, CT 〉 and action policy a:
(A.3) Eat
[(∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)u(as, cs)ds+ e−r(T−t)U(CT )
)2]
<∞,
(A.4) Eat
[(∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)ua(as, cs)ds
)2]
<∞.
If the agent follows the recommendations, his expected utility at time t is a Qa
r
-martingale.
Specifically, for all s > t, Ea
r
t [Vs(a
r)] = Vt(a
r). Therefore, applying the martingale repre-
sentation theorem, there exists a unique square-integrable and FYt -adapted stochastic process
(e−rtσζt)t≥0 such that
Vt(a
r) = V0(a
r) +
∫ t
0
e−rsσζsdZa
r
s .
Define the agent’s time t promised utility (continuation payoff from following the recommen-
dation) by
Wt(a
r) , Eart
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)u(ars, cs)ds+ e
−r(T−t)U(CT )
]
,
with terminal condition WT (a
r) = U(CT ). It evolves according to
dWt(a
r) =
(
rWt(a
r)− u(art , ct)
)
dt+ σζtdZ
ar
t (8)
=
(
rWt(a
r)− u(art , ct)
)
dt+ ζt
(
dYt − f¯(prt , art )dt
)
.
The term ζt captures how sensitive the agent’s continuation utility is to the observed out-
come. For each additional unit of output above the principal’s expectation, f¯(prt , a
r
t )dt, the
agent’s promised utility is increased by ζt utils. Notice that ζt serves an analogous purpose to
the bonuses in the two-period, two outcome setting; to provide the agent with incentives to
work.
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When there is no uncertainty, i.e. p0 ∈ {0, 1}, the process given in (8) is independent of
the agent’s past actions. This property reduces the problem of writing incentive compatible
contracts to a Markov-problem where the promised utility is a state variable. In contrast,
when there is uncertainty with p0 ∈ (0, 1), the entire history of past actions affects the agent’s
posterior, which in turn affects the process Za. Thus, the evolution of the agent’s promised
utility at time t depends on the agent’s period t belief. Since the agent’s beliefs are his private
information, the principal cannot directly use them as another state variable in the contracting
problem. Additionally, if the agent deviated in the past, his continuation payoff may evolve
differently from (8).
3 Incentive Compatible Contracts
For a proposed contract 〈ar, c, CT 〉, the agent’s problem is to choose an admissible action policy
that maximizes his expected payoff,
max
a
V0(a) s.t. (AP)
dYt = f¯(p
a
t , at)dt+ σdZ
a
t ,
dpat = p
a
t (1− pat )
∆f(at)
σ
dZat .
A contract 〈ar, c, CT 〉 is incentive compatible if the recommendation policy ar is a solution to
the agent’s problem (AP).
3.1 Necessary Conditions
The formulation of the agent’s problem in (AP) is straightforward. The agent affects his payoff
through three channels: (i) he incurs a cost associated with his action choice, (ii) he affects the
average flow of output dYt which then affects his compensation, and (iii) he affects the evolution
of his posterior belief as well as the probability measure he uses to evaluate his continuation
payoffs. Nevertheless, solving (AP) directly is difficult as the proposed contract can depend on
the entire output path making the problem non-Markovian.
Another, now standard, formulation of the agent’s problem is to consider the entire output
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path on [0, T ] as a random variable.9 The agent’s action changes the probability measure over
the different possible output paths that can be realized. I use this latter formulation which is
closer to the two-period, two-outcome setting in which the agent’s action changes the probability
of realizing a successful outcome.
Let Z0 , (Z0t )t≥0 be a standard Brownian motion under some probability measure Q0 and
let Z0t be the natural filtration generated by Z0t . As σ > 0 is a constant, the tuple (Y, Z0, Q0)
is a weak solution to the SDE
dYt = σdZ
0
t .
That is, the process Yt has no drift under the measure Q
0.
For any admissible action policy a, define Γat to be a Z0t -measurable and square-integrable
stochastic exponential process given by
Γat = exp
(∫ t
0
f¯(pas , as)
σ
dZ0s −
1
2
∫ t
0
∣∣∣∣ f¯(pas , as)σ
∣∣∣∣2 ds
)
,
with Γa0 = 1 as an initial condition. Given Assumption (A.1), Novikov’s condition holds and
Γat is a Q
0-martingale.10 Therefore, Γat is the Radon-Nikodym derivative capturing the change
in measure dQ
a
dQ0
|Z0t . Using the Girsanov theorem, we can define the standard Brownian motion
under Qa as the process Za such that
Zat = Z
0
t −
∫ t
0
f¯(pas , as)
σ
ds.
Furthermore, the tuple (Y, Za, Qa) is a weak solution to the SDE11
dYt = f¯(p
a
t , at)dt+ σdZ
a
t .
Notice that under the measure Qa, we recover the setup where Yt has a drift of
∫ t
0
f¯(pas , as)ds.
We can apply the change of measure to transform the agent’s expected payoff from
Ea0
[∫ T
0
e−rtu(at, ct)dt+ e−rTU(CT )
]
9This approach was first suggested by Mirrlees (1974) and developed by Holmstrom (1979). For examples in
discrete time, see Abreu et al. (1986, 1990), Spear and Srivastrava (1987), and Green (1987). For examples in
continuous time, see Sannikov (2008), Cvitanic´ et al. (2009), and Williams (2009).
10Specifically, |f¯(p, a)| ≤ maxθ∈Θ max{|f(θ, 0)|, |f(θ, a¯)|} <∞. See Lipster and Shiryaev, Chapter 6.
11From (A.1), the function f satisfies the linear growth and Lipschitz conditions for a solution.
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to
E00
[∫ T
0
e−rtΓatu(at, ct)dt+ e
−rTΓaTU(CT )
]
where E0t is the expectation operator with respect to the measure Q
0 in period t.
Let Xat , patΓat be the process that captures the covariation between beliefs and the change
in measure.12 Using Itoˆ’s lemma, Xat evolves according to
dXat = X
a
t
f(θ1, at)
σ
dZ0t .
We can now reformulate the agent’s problem given in (AP). Fix a contract 〈ar, c, CT 〉. The
agent’s problem is to choose an admissible action policy that maximizes his expected payoff,
max
a
E00
[∫ T
0
e−rtΓatu(at, ct)dt+ e
−rTΓaTU(CT )
]
(RAP)
s.t. Γat = Γ
a
t
f¯
(
Xat
Γat
, at
)
σ
dZ0t , Γ
a
0 = 1
dXat = X
a
t
f(θ1, at)
σ
dZ0t , X
a
0 = p0.
Since the measure Q0 is now independent of the agent’s action, the reformulated agent’s problem
(RAP) is an optimal control problem with (Γat , X
a
t ) as the state variables and at as the control
variable. We can directly apply the stochastic maximum principle (Bismut 1973, 1978, Zhou
1996) to identify necessary conditions for incentive compatibility.
Theorem 1 Suppose assumption A.1-A.4 hold. If a contract 〈ar, c, CT 〉 is incentive compati-
ble, there exist FYt -adapted, square-integrable co-states (γt, σηt) and (λt, σϕt) such that
i. γt evolves according to
dγt =
(
rγt − u(art , ct) + ηtprt∆f(art )
)
dt+ σηtdZ
ar
t (9)
with γT = U(CT ),
12The transformation of pat to X
a
t is a convenient rescaling that simplifies the expression for the Hamiltonian.
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ii. λt evolves according to
dλt =
(
rλt −∆f(art )
(
ηt + ϕt(1− prt )
))
dt+ σϕtdZ
ar
t , (10)
with λT = 0, and
iii. For each t, art solves
max
at∈A
u(at, ct) + ηtf¯(p
r
t , at) + ϕtp
r
tf(θ1, at) (11)
almost surely.
3.2 Interpretation of Co-States
In the two-period, two-outcome models of Section 1.1, the principal provides incentives for
the agent through a bonus. In particular, the bonus captures the difference in the agent’s
contemporaneous and continuation payoffs when he generates a successful outcome versus a
failed one. Furthermore, when the agent’s actions have long run consequences, as in Section
1.1.2 and 1.1.3, the principal must account for how bonuses and actions in the second period
affect incentives in the first period.
An analogous characterization of incentive compatibility is possible in the continuous time
setting. This section reformulates the necessary conditions for incentive compatibility in Theo-
rem 1 by using two state variables: Wt(a
r), the agent’s promised utility, and Rt, to be defined
further below.
Proposition 1 For each t ∈ [0, T ], the process γt + prtλt = Wt(ar), almost surely.
To build some intuition, suppose both the agent and the principal know that θ = θ0, i.e.,
p0 = p
a
t = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] and all admissible action policy a. The evolution of γt given in (9)
simplifies to
dγt =
(
rγt − u(art , ct)
)
dt+ ηt
(
dYt − f(θ0, art )dt
)
with γT = U(CT ). Thus, the process γt would be equivalent to the agent’s promised utility in
a complete information setting with θ = θ0. In particular, γt would be equivalent to
Wt(a
r; θ0) , Ea
r,θ0
t
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)u(ars, cs)ds+ e
−r(T−t)U(CT )
]
,
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where Ea
r,θ0
t is the expectation operator given the filtration σ(Ys, a
r
s, θ0 : 0 ≤ s ≤ t).
Now suppose that agent and the principal know that θ = θ1, i.e., p0 = p
a
t = 1 for all
t ∈ [0, T ] and all admissible action policy a. The evolution of γt + λt simplifies to
dγt + dλt =
(
r(γt + λt)− u(art , ct)
)
dt+ (ηt + ϕt)
(
dYt − f(θ1, art )dt
)
with γT + λT = U(CT ) which would represent the evolution of the agent’s promised utility in a
complete information setting with θ = θ1. In particular, the process γt+λt would be equivalent
to
Wt(a
r; θ1) , Ea
r,θ1
t
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)u(ars, cs)ds+ e
−r(T−t)U(CT )
]
,
where Ea
r,θ1
t is the expectation operator given the filtration σ(Ys, a
r
s, θ1 : 0 ≤ s ≤ t).
Given the above intuition for the co-states under full information, it seems that we could
interpret γt as the agent’s promised utility conditional on θ = θ0 and γt + λt as the agent’s
promised utility conditional on θ = θ1. Furthermore, the agent’s promised utility under incom-
plete information would then be expressed as
Wt(a
r) = prtWt(a
r; θ1) + (1− prt )Wt(ar; θ0) = γt + prtλt.
However, the above interpretation is problematic: when there is uncertainty about θ, the
filtration σ(Ys, a
r
s, θ : 0 ≤ s ≤ t) is richer than Fart ≡ FYt . As γt and λt are FYt -adapted, such
an interpretation would be inaccurate. Nevertheless, Proposition 1 shows that the intuition
still holds.
The other key variable accounts for the long term effects of the recommended action choices
on the agent’s subsequent incentives. Let
Rt , Ea
r
t
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)ζsprs(1− prs)∆f(ars)ds
]
,
with terminal condition RT = 0. The agent always has (weakly) more information than the
principal at any given time; he chooses the action policy that generates the data used to update
beliefs. Any deviation at time t from the recommendation will generate asymmetric information
through the posterior beliefs for the remainder of the contract.
To be more concrete, suppose the agent makes a “one-shot deviation” at time t from the
recommendation art to a˜t ∈ A. His belief process for the remainder of the contract is (pa˜s)t<s≤T .
The principal, unaware of the deviation, continues to hold the belief process (prs)t<s≤T . Thus,
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the deviation generates a persistent difference of (pa˜s − prs)t<s≤T between the agent’s and the
principal’s beliefs.
In order to provide incentives to the agent at time k > t, the principal increases the agent’s
promised utility by ζk
(
dYk − f(prk, ark)dk
)
which has an expected value of zero at time t under
the probability measure Qa
r
.13 However, from the agent’s perspective, his incentives at time k
have changed to
ζk
(
dYk − f(pa˜k, ark)dk
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected value of zero under Qa˜
+ζk
(
f(pa˜k, a
r
k)− f(prk, ark)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=∆f(ark)(p
a˜
k−prk)
dk.
Aggregating the change in incentives over the remaining time (t, T ] yields the expected payoff
difference from the deviation
E a˜t
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)ζs∆f(ars)(p
a˜
s − prs)ds
]
.
Notice the similarity to the persistent marginal effects in (6) from the two-period , two outcome
model of Section 1.1.3. The process Rt captures the discounted expected marginal benefit of
such a deviation from the recommended action.
Following the dynamic mechanism design approach of Pavan et al. (2014), Rt can further
be understood as the dynamic virtual surplus associated with the agent’s “hidden type” (his
true posterior belief). It accounts for the marginal effect of the agent’s current “type report”
on his payoffs as well as on his future “reports”.14 As I show below, Rt is equivalent to the
covariance between the agent’s total payoff and his on-path beliefs.
Proposition 2 There exists a square-integrable and FYt -adapted process σβt such that
dRt =
(
rRt − ζtprt (1− prt )∆f(art )
)
dt+ σβtdZ
ar
t , with RT = 0. (17)
Furthermore, Rt is equivalent to
i. ertcovt
(
VT (a
r), prT
)
, and
ii. λtp
r
t (1− prt ),
13More precisely, Ea
r
t [ζk
(
dYk − f(prk, ark)dk
)
] = Ea
r
t [σζkdZ
ar
k ] = 0, for k > t.
14The latter effect is called the impulse response function.
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almost surely.
The necessary conditions for incentive compatibility can now be expressed using Wt(a
r)
and Rt as the key state variables. Theorem 2 generalizes the necessary conditions for incentive
compatibility in the existing literature to a setting with both incomplete information, and
general production and utility functions.
Theorem 2 Suppose assumption A.1-A.4 hold. If a contract 〈ar, c, CT 〉 is incentive compat-
ible, there exist FYt -adapted and square-integrable processes (Wt(ar), σζt) and (Rt, σβt) such
that
i. Wt(a
r) evolves according to (8) with WT (a
r) = U(CT ),
ii. Rt evolves according to (17) with RT = 0, and
iii. For each t, art solves
max
at∈A
u(at, ct) + ζtf¯(p
r
t , at) + βt∆f(at)−Rt
∆f(art )
σ2
(
f(θ1, at)− prt∆f(at)
)
(18)
almost surely.
Consider first the case of complete information with p0 ∈ {0, 1} and pat = p0 for any t and
any action policy a. Then Rt ≡ λtp0(1 − p0) = 0 at all time t. As Rt is a constant process,
the sensitivity process βt is also equivalent to zero for all t. Hence, the necessary condition for
incentive compatibility given by (18) reduces to
art ∈ arg max
at∈A
u(at, ct) + ζt f¯(p
r
t , at)︸ ︷︷ ︸
f¯(p0,at)
.
At each time t, the agent’s promised utility increases by ζt per additional unit of output.
A marginal increase in the action at would increase the average flow of output by f¯a(p
r
t , at).
Consequently, the marginal benefit to the agent is given by ζtf¯a(p
r
t , at) whereas the marginal
cost from an increase in the action is ua(at, ct). An incentive compatible recommendation a
r
t
will balance these two opposing forces. In particular, if art is in the interior of A, then
ζt = −ua(a
r
t , ct)
f¯a(prt , a
r
t )
,
21
which is a similar necessary condition to the two-period, two-outcome model discussed in Section
1.1.1. Moreover, the necessary conditions from Sannikov (2008) are a special case of (18) with
f(θ, a) = a and an additively separable utility function u(a, c).
Consider next a marginal increase in the agent’s action art under incomplete information,
i.e., p0 ∈ (0, 1).15 The instantaneous marginal effects still take the form
ua(a
r
t , ct)︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal cost
+ ζtf¯a(p
r
t , a
r
t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal benefit from
raising the average flow of output
.
In addition to the instantaneous marginal effects, there is an effect on how the agent’s sub-
sequent beliefs evolve, and ultimately, how he responds to incentives over the remaining time
period.
Suppose the agent makes a “one-shot deviation” at time t from the recommendation art to
a˜t ∈ A. As discussed earlier, the deviation strategy changes the agent’s time k > t incentives
by ζk∆f(a
r
k)(p
a˜
k − prk)dk. Dividing this term by a˜t − art and taking the limit as the difference
goes to zero gives
ζk∆f(a
r
k)
dprk
dart
dk
which is the persistent marginal effect of art on the agent’s time k incentives. Unfortunately,
deriving an expression for dprk/da
r
t proves difficult for general production functions.
To simplify, let f(θ, a) = θ + a which implies ∆f(a) = θ1 − θ0 , ∆θ is a constant. The
necessary condition for incentive compatibility given by (18) reduces to
art ∈ arg max
at∈A
u(at, ct) + ζtat −Rt∆θ
σ2
at. (19)
Let Ark =
∫ k
0
arsds be the agent’s cumulative action at time k when he follows the recommenda-
tion. Conditional on parameter θ, the total output at time k is normally distributed with
Yk ∼ N (Ark + θk, σ2k).
15It is no longer the case that pat = p0 for all t and all action policy a.
22
Using Bayes rule, the agent’s on-path posterior at time k is
prk =
p0 exp
(
−(Yk − Ark − θ1k)2/2σ2k
)
p0 exp
(
−(Yk − Ark − θ1k)2/2σ2k
)
+ (1− p0) exp
(
−(Yk − Ark − θ0k)2/2σ2k
)
=
p0 exp
(
∆θ
2σ2
(
2(Yk − Ark)− (θ0 + θ1)k
))
p0 exp
(
∆θ
2σ2
(
2(Yk − Ark)− (θ0 + θ1)k
))
+ 1− p0
.
By taking the derivative of the above expression with respect to art , the marginal effect of a
r
t
on time k incentives can be expressed as
ζk∆f(a
r
k)
dprk
dart
= −ζkprk(1− prk)
∆2θ
σ2
dArk
dart
= −ζkprk(1− prk)
∆2θ
σ2
.
Collecting all such terms for k ∈ (t, T ], discounting them, and taking expectations yields
−Eart
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)ζkprk(1− prk)
∆2θ
σ2
]
= −Rt∆θ
σ2
.
Hence, the total marginal effect of the agent’s action art is given by
ua(a
r
t , ct) + ζt −Rt
∆θ
σ2
which corresponds to the maximization problem given in (19).16 Thus, an incentive compatible
contract balances (i) the instantaneous marginal cost of action, (ii) the instantaneous marginal
increase in promised utility from increasing the average output flow, and (iii) the discounted
long-run marginal effect of the recommended effort on future incentives captured through the
covariance of payoffs and beliefs.
Theorem 2 generalizes the rough intuition presented in the linear additive case to more
general production functions. Recall that |∆f(a)| measures the informativeness of the observed
output flow. Specifically, a large and positive (negative) ∆f(a) is a strong indication in favor of
θ1 (θ0). In the general case, ∆f(·) is not a constant which implies the agent’s actions affect the
quality of information. Hence, a deviation at time t not only creates a persistent gap between
16A similar necessary condition is derived by Prat and Jovanovic (2014) and Demarzo and Sannikov (2016) for
linear additive production functions with a normally distributed parameter.
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the agent’s and the principal’s beliefs but also affects the rate of instantaneous learning. For
example, if ∆f ′(a) > 0, the agent can increase the quality of information by increasing his
action choices, thereby increasing the variance in his belief process.17 The term βt∆f
′(art ) in
(18) accounts for this marginal effect of the agent’s action on the sensitivity of the payoff-belief
covariance.
I conclude this section by comparing the sensitivity of the agent’s promised utility under
complete and incomplete information. This corresponds to the amount of risk the agent needs
to be exposed to in order to incentivize him.
Corollary 1 Suppose assumptions A.1-A.4 hold, sign (∆f(a)) = sign (∆f(a′)), ∀a, a′ ∈ A,
and ∆f(a) is monotone (increasing or decreasing). Given an incentive compatible contract
〈ar, c, CT 〉, if
i. The processes (ηt, ϕt) from Theorem 1 are non-negative, and
ii. art ∈ Int(A),
then ζt ≥ minθ∈Θ−ua(art , ct)/fa(θ, art ).
Suppose the sensitivities of the co-states, (ηt, ϕt), are non-negative.
18 Assume that one of the
parameters is more productive than the other, for example, f(θ1, a) ≥ f(θ0, a) for all a ∈ A. If
higher actions lead to more informative signals, i.e., ∆f ′(·) ≥ 0, then, a principal who wishes
to induce a particular level of effort must expose the agent to more risk under incomplete
information than she would have under complete information with θ = θ1. On the other
hand, if higher actions lead to less informative signals, i.e., ∆f ′(·) ≤ 0, then the principal
must expose the agent to more risk under incomplete information than she would have under
complete information with θ = θ0. As a consequence, if f(θ, a) is additively separable, then the
agent is exposed to more risk under incomplete information.
3.3 Sufficient Conditions
In continuous time models of moral hazard with complete information, the necessary condi-
tions for incentive compatibility are also sufficient.19 In contrast, characterizing general and
17The variance increases because the more informative signal allows the agent to updates his posteriors more
aggressively.
18While the sign of (ηt, ϕt) is an outcome of the principal’s problem, heuristically, negative sensitivities serve to
only reduce the agent’s incentive to work at time t.
19See Sannikov (2008).
24
tractable sufficient conditions for models of moral hazard with private information is still an
open question. Most papers instead use the first-order approach: solve a relaxed version of
the principal’s problem using the necessary conditions and check ex-post that the contract is
incentive compatible. While the focus of this paper is on identifying necessary conditions for
incentive compatibility under incomplete information, I provide a general, albeit intractable,
sufficient condition.
Theorem 3 Suppose assumptions A.1-A.4 hold. A contract 〈ar, c, CT 〉 is incentive compatible
if there exist FYt -adapted, square-integrable co-states (γt, σηt) and (λt, σϕt) such that
i. γt evolves according to (9) with γT = U(CT ),
ii. λt evolves according to (10) with λT = 0,
iii. For each t, art solves (11) almost surely, and
iv. For any arbitrary admissible policy a and associated belief process (pat )0≤t≤T ,
Ea0
[∫ T
0
e−rt(pat − prt )
(
ηt
(
∆f(at)−∆f(art )
)
+ ϕt
(
f(θ1, at)− f(θ1, art )
))
dt
]
≤ 0. (20)
Theorem 3 states that the necessary conditions along with the additional condition (20) are
sufficient for incentive compatibility. Under complete information, pat = p
r
t = p0 for all t, which
implies that (20) always holds with equality. Thus, the necessary conditions in Theorem 1 are
also sufficient. Unfortunately, when there is incomplete information, it is generally difficult to
check if condition (20) holds without imposing a lot of structure on the production function.
Corollary 2 Suppose assumptions A.1-A.4 hold. Further assume that (A) the production func-
tion f(θ, a) is additively separable with ∆f(·) ≥ 0, and (B) for each t, the agent’s action space
is At , [0, art ]. A contract 〈ar, c, CT 〉 is incentive compatible if there exist FYt -adapted and
square-integrable co-states (γt, σηt) and (λt, σϕt) such that
i. γt evolves according to (9) with γT = U(CT ),
ii. λt evolves according to (10) with λT = 0,
iii. For each t, art solves
max
at∈At
u(at, ct) + ηtf¯(p
r
t , at) + ϕtp
r
tf(θ1, at)
almost surely, and
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iv. For each t, ϕt ≥ 0.
The corollary applies to “shirking models” in which the agent can choose an action level
up to the recommendation but not more.20 For example, let the recommendation art be the
amount of an input resource (raw materials, capital investment, or time) the principal allocates
for production. A contract is incentive compatible if the agent chooses to use all of the allocated
input resource as intended instead of diverting part of it for his personal use.
When the production function is additively separable and θ1 is the more productive param-
eter, then any deviation (shirking) strategy generates a belief process that is more optimistic
than that of the principal’s. To see why, let f(θ, a) = θ+ a. Suppose the agent shirks at time t
and chooses at < a
r
t . The principal attributes only dYt− artdt of the total observed output flow
to the parameter whereas the agent attributes (art − at)dt > 0 more to the parameter. Hence,
the agent believes the parameter is more productive than the principal does which implies
pas ≥ prs for all s ≥ t. Given the additional structure imposed in Corollary 2, the expression in
(20) simplifies to
Ea0
∫ T
0
e−rtϕt (pat − prt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(at − art )︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
dt
 .
Thus, the necessary conditions along with a non-negative process (ϕt)t≥0 are sufficient for a
contract to be incentive compatible.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I consider agency models under incomplete information to study the implicit
persistent effects of effort on future incentive. I show the principal must keep track of the
agent’s promised utility, his on-path belief, and the covariance between beliefs and total payoffs.
The latter captures the long-run effects from a marginal increase in current effort.
Since the production function places minimal restrictions on how effort and the parameter
interact, the necessary conditions I derive can be used to explore dynamic agency problems
using the first-order approach in models that have yet been considered. For example, the
model can be used to study an extension of Bolton and Harris (1999) in which the principal
can choose to either invest in a safe status-quo project or to finance a risky project managed
by an agent.
20While the action space so far has been exogenously given and stationary, all the results can be directly
extended to the case where At , [0, art ] by treating the action space as part of the contract specifications.
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5 Appendix
Proof. Theorem 1:
Let (γt, ηt) and (λt, ϕt) be the Z0t -adapted, square-integrable co-states associated with the
state variables Γat and X
a
t respectively. The Hamiltonian for the control problem (RAP) is
given by
H(a, c,Γ, X, γ, η, λ, ϕ) , Γu(a, c) + f¯
(
X
Γ
, a
)
Γη +Xϕf(θ1, a). (12)
If the contract 〈ar, c, CT 〉 is incentive compatible, then ar must be a solution to (RAP). There-
fore, at each t, art must solve
max
at∈A
H(at, ct,Γart , Xa
r
t , γt, ηt, λt, ϕt). (13)
Furthermore, the co-states evolve according to:
dγt =
(
rγt −HΓ(at, ct,Γart , Xa
r
t , γt, ηt, λt, ϕt)
)
dt+ ηtdZ
0
t
=
rγt − u(art , ct)− σηt
 f¯
(
Xa
r
t
Γa
r
t
, art
)
σ
− ∆f(a
r
t )
σ
Xa
r
t
Γa
r
t
 dt+ σηtdZ0t , (14)
with terminal condition γT =
∂Γa
r
T U(CT )
∂Γ
= U(CT ), and
dλt =
(
rλt −HX(at, ct,Γart , Xa
r
t , γt, ηt, λt, ϕt)
)
dt+ σϕtdZ
0
t
=
(
rλt − σηt∆f(a
r
t )
σ
− σϕtf(θ1, a
r
t )
σ
)
dt+ σϕtdZ
0
t , (15)
with terminal condition λT =
∂Γa
r
T U(CT )
∂X
= 0.
Using the fact that Γa
r
t > 0 and
Xa
r
t
Γa
r
t
= prt , we can simplify (13) to (11). Additionally, using
dZa
r
t = dZ
0
t −
f¯(prt , a
r
t )
σ
dt = dZ0t −
f¯
(
Xa
r
t
Γa
r
t
, art
)
σ
dt,
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we can further rewrite (14) as (9) and (15) as (10). Finally, notice that if the agent follows the
recommendations, he does not have any more information than the principal on-path. Hence,
the filtrations FY ,Fa, and Z0 coincide.
Proof. Proposition 1:
Applying Itoˆ’s lemma shows that γt + p
r
tλt evolves according to(
r(γt + p
r
tλt)− u(art , ct)
)
dt+ σ
(
ηt + p
r
tϕt + λtp
r
t (1− pt)r
∆f(art )
σ2
)
dZa
r
t ,
with the terminal conditions for the co-states satisfying U(CT ) = γT + p
r
TλT = WT (a
r). From
(8),
U(CT ) =Wt(a
r) +
∫ T
t
{
rWs(a
r)− u(ars, cs)
}
ds+
∫ T
t
σζsdZ
ar
s
=γt + p
r
tλt +
∫ T
t
{
r(γs + p
r
sλs)− u(ars, cs)
}
ds+
∫ T
t
σ
(
ηs + p
r
sϕs + λsp
r
s(1− ps)r
∆f(ars)
σ2
)
dZa
r
s
for each t. As such a decomposition is almost surely unique, we have γt + p
r
tλt = Wt(a
r) and
ζt = ηt + p
r
tϕt + λtp
r
t (1− pt)r
∆f(art )
σ2
for all t ≤ T almost surely.
Proof. Proposition 2: Let
Rˆt , Ea
r
t
[∫ T
0
e−rsζsprs(1− prs)∆f(ars)ds
]
,
which is an FYt -martingale. Hence, there exists a square-integrable and FYt -adapted process
e−rtσβt such that dRˆt = e−rtσβtdZa
r
t . Since,
Rt = e
rtRˆt −
∫ t
0
e−r(s−t)ζsprs(1− prs)∆f(ars)ds,
an application of Itoˆ’s lemma yields (17).
To see that Rt = e
rtcovt
(
VT (a
r), prT
)
, note that the covariation between the agent’s expected
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utility and his on-path beliefs is governed by
d〈V (ar), pr〉t = e−rtζtprt (1− prt )∆f(art )dt
implying
Rt =e
rtEa
r
t
[∫ T
t
d〈V (ar), pr〉s
]
=ert
Ea
r
t [VT (a
r)prT ]− Vt(ar)prt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Ea
r
t [VT (a
r)]Ea
r
t [prT ]
−Eart
[∫ T
t
Vs(a
r)dprs
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−Eart
[∫ T
t
prsdVs(a
r)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0

=ert covt(VT (a
r), prT ).
Finally, note that RT = λTp
r
T (1− prT ) = 0 because λT = 0 by Theorem 1. Hence,
0 =Rt +
∫ T
t
(
rRs − ζsprs(1− prs)∆f(ars)
)
ds+
∫ T
t
σβsdZ
ar
s
=λtp
r
t (1− prt ) +
∫
T
t
(
rλsp
r
s(1− prs)−
{
ηs + ϕsp
r
s + λsp
r
s(1− prs)
∆f(ars)
σ2
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ζs
prs(1− prs)∆f(ars)
)
ds
+
∫ T
t
σ
(
λsp
r
s(1− prs)(1− 2prs)
∆f(ars)
σ2
+ ϕsp
r
s(1− prs)
)
dZa
r
s .
A similar argument to Proposition 1 establishes that Rt = λtp
r
t (1− prt ) and
βt = Rt(1− 2prt )
∆f(art )
σ2
+ ϕtp
r
t (1− prt )
for each t ≤ T almost surely.
Proof. Theorem 2: From Theorem 1, a necessary condition for incentive compatibility is
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that the recommendation art solves (11). We can rewrite (11) as (18) by substituting ηt by
ζt − prtϕt − λtprt (1− prt )
∆f(art )
σ2
,
λtp
r
t (1− prt ) by Rt, and ϕtprt (1− prt ) by
βt −Rt(1− 2prt )
∆f(art )
σ2
.
Proof. Corollary 1: If art ∈ Int(A), then from the first order conditions associated with (11),
ua(a
r
t , ct) + ηtf¯a(p
r
t , a
r
t ) + p
r
tϕtfa(θ1, a
r
t ) = 0. (21)
From Proposition 1,
ζt = (ηt + ϕt)p
r
t + ηt(1− prt ) +Rt
∆f(art )
σ2
. (22)
Assume that ∆f(·) does not change sign and the processes (ηt, ϕt)0≤t≤T are non-negative. I
first show that Rt
∆f(art )
σ2
≥ 0. Substituting for ζt in (17), we get
dRt =
(
Rt
(
r − prt (1− prt )
(
∆f(art )
σ
)2)
− (ηt + prtϕt)prt (1− prt )∆f(art )
)
dt+ σβtdZ
ar
t .
Hence,
Rt = E
ar
t
[∫ T
t
e
−r(s−t)+∫ st prk(1−prk)(∆f(ark)σ )2dk(ηs + prsϕs)prs(1− prs)∆f(ars)ds
]
and the sign of Rt is the same as the sign of ∆f .
If ∆f ′(·) ≥ 0, then −ua(art ,ct)
fa(θ0,art )
≥ −ua(art ,ct)
fa(θ1,art )
. Using the FOC (21) above,
(ηt + ϕt)p
r
t = −
ua(a
r
t , ct)
f¯a(θ1, art )
− ηt (1− p
r
t )
f¯a(θ1, art )
.
Substituting into (22), we have
ζt = −ua(a
r
t , ct)
f(θ1, art )
+ ηt
(1− prt )∆f ′(art )
f(θ1, art )
+Rt
∆f(art )
σ2
≥ −ua(a
r
t , ct)
f(θ1, art )
.
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Similarly, if ∆f ′(·) ≤ 0, then −ua(art ,ct)
fa(θ1,art )
≥ −ua(art ,ct)
fa(θ0,art )
. Using the FOC (21),
ηt(1− prt ) = −
ua(a
r
t , ct)
f¯a(θ0, art )
− (ηt + ϕt) (p
r
t )
f¯a(θ0, art )
.
Substituting into (22), we have
ζt = −ua(a
r
t , ct)
f(θ0, art )
− (ηt + ϕt)p
r
t∆f
′(art )
f(θ0, art )
+Rt
∆f(art )
σ2
≥ −ua(a
r
t , ct)
f(θ0, art )
.
Proof. Theorem 3: Take any arbitrary admissible action policy a, the belief process it
generates (pat )0≤t≤T , and the belief process generated by the recommendations (p
r
t )0≤t≤T . The
agent’s total payoff is given by
VT (a) =
∫ T
0
e−rsu(a˜s, cs)ds+ e−rTU(CT ).
Using the terminal conditions that γT = U(CT ) and λT = 0, we have
VT (a) =
∫ T
0
e−rsu(a˜s, cs)ds+ e−rT
(
γT + λTp
a
T
)
.
From (7), (9), and (10), we can derive the evolution of e−rt(γt + λtpat ) as
e−rt
(
− u(art , ct) + ηt∆f(art )(prt − pat ) + patϕt
(
∆f(at)(1− pat )−∆f(art )(1− prt )
))
dt+
e−rt
(
λtp
a
t (1− pat )
∆f(at)
σ
)
dZat + e
−rtσ (ηt + patϕt) dZ
ar
t
=e−rt
(
− u(art , ct) + ηt
(
f¯(pat , at)− f¯(prt , art )
)
+ patϕtf(θ1, at)− prtϕtf(θ1, art )
)
dt+
e−rt
(
ηt∆f(a
r
t ) + ϕtf(θ1, a
r
t )
)
(prt − pat )dt+ e−rtσ
(
λtp
a
t (1− pat )
∆f(at)
σ2
+ ηt + p
a
tϕt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Xt
dZat ,
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where the equality follows by the change of measure from Qa
r
to Qa such that
dZa
r
t = dZ
a
t +
f¯(pat , at)− f¯(prt , art )
σ
dt.
Let H(at, pt) , u(at, ct) + ηtf¯(pt, at) + ptϕtf(θ1, at). Combining the expression for VT (a) with
the evolution of e−rt(γt + λtpat ), we get
VT (a) = γ0 + λ0p0︸ ︷︷ ︸
=W0(ar)≡V0(ar)
+
∫ T
0
e−rtu(a˜t, ct)dt+
∫ T
0
d
(
e−rt(γt + λtpat )
)
=V0(a
r) +
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
H(at, p
a
t )−H(art , prt )−Hp(art , prt )(pat − prt )
)
dt+
∫ T
0
XtdZat .
As Vt(a) is a Q
a-martingale, Ea0 [VT (a)] = V0(a). Taking expectations of the right hand side
under Qa yields
V0(a) =V0(a
r) + Ea0
[∫ T
0
e−rt
{
H(at, p
a
t )−H(art , prt )−Hp(art , prt )(pat − prt )
}
dt
]
=V0(a
r) + Ea0
[∫ T
0
e−rt
{
H(at, p
r
t )−H(art , prt ) +
(
Hp(at, p
r
t )−Hp(art , prt )
)
(pat − prt )
}
dt
]
≤V0(ar) + Ea0
[∫ T
0
e−rt
(
Hp(at, p
r
t )−Hp(art , prt )
)
(pat − prt )dt
]
=V0(a
r) + Ea0
[∫ T
0
e−rt(pat − prt )
(
ηt
(
∆f(at)−∆f(art )
)
+ ϕt
(
f(θ1, at)− f(θ1, art )
))
dt
]
,
where the second equality follows from the linearity of H(at, pt) in pt, and the inequality follows
from the fact that for all t ∈ [0, T ], art ∈ arg maxa∈AH(a, prt ) almost surely. Hence, if the second
term in the last line is non-positive, we have V0(a) ≤ V0(ar) for any arbitrary admissible policy
a.21
21Note that if H(at, pt) was concave in (at, pt), then the necessary conditions would also be sufficient. However,
the Hessian of H(at, pt) is not negative semi-definite.
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